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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintif^Appellant, 
vs. 
JACOB B. LOVELESS, 
Defendanf/Appellee. 
Case No. 20070419-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
* * * 
Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State submits 
this brief in reply to new matters raised in respondent's brief. 
ARGUMENT 
THE PROSECUTOR DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANTS DUE 
PROCESS RIGHT TO FAIRNESS BY AMENDING THE 
INFORMATION TO CHARGE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AS AN 
ALTERNATIVE OFFENSE 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor's motive for amending the original 
information to include the alternative charge of aggravated assault was a violation 
of his due process right to fairness and provides a "further reason" for affirming the 
trial court's order below. Aple. Brf. at 13-16. This argument lacks merit 
In his brief, Aple. Brf. at 13, 16, Defendant contends that the prosecutor 
violated rule 3.8(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides that 
" [t]he prosecutor in a criminal^ase shall. . . [r]efrain from prosecuting a charge that 
the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause." Utah R. Pro. Cond. 
3.8(e). Defendant's contention is unsupported by the record. Indeed, the magistrate 
bound Defendant over to stand trial on the alternative charges after finding 
probable cause, and the trial court denied Defendant's motion to quash the bindover 
order. R. 45-44,77-72. Defendant did not seek appeal of the trial court's order, nor 
has he challenged the facts supporting the probable cause finding in his brief here. 
See Aple. Brf. 6-17. Defendant's claim thus fails. 
Defendant criticizes the prosecutor for telling the court that he could not 
provide a factual basis for the plea of reckless endangerment, because the facts the 
prosecution alleged supported an aggravated assault conviction. Aple. Brf. at 16. 
Defendant misconstrues the import of the statement made by the prosecutor, who 
was contesting Defendant's attempt to plead to the lesser alternative charge. See R. 
476. The prosecutor's only point was that the State maintained that the facts 
supported aggravated assault, rather than reckless endangerment. That position did 
not suggest that a jury could not find otherwise, based on its review of the evidence, 
including any elicited by the defense. There was nothing improper about the 
prosecutor's position. 
Defendant also contends that the prosecutor's amended filing was an 
improper use of prosecutorial power to "harass" him, in violation of due process as 
explained in State v. Brickey, 7U P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). Aplt. Brf. at 13. The question 
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in Brickey, however, was whether a prosecutor could refile charges once dismissed 
for failure to show probable cause. In contrast, and as noted, the magistrate in this 
case bound Defendant over on the alternative charges after finding probable cause, 
and the trial court denied a subsequent challenge to that decision in a motion to 
quash the bindover. R. 45-44,77-72. "In our system, so long as the prosecutor has 
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, 
the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file..., generally rests 
entirely in his discretion." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). That 
discretion violates due process only if the prosecutor's charging decision " 'was . . . 
deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other 
arbitrary classification/" Id. (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,456 (1962)). 
It is true that a prosecutor may not "retaliate] against the accused for lawfully 
attacking his conviction" by thereafter charging a more serious offense. Id. at 363 
(emphasis added). That is a very different situation than what is presented here. In 
this case, Defendant had been convicted of nothing. Even assuming, arguendo, that 
the prosecutor threatened to amend the information to include the aggravated 
assault alternative if Defendant insisted on going to trial, such plea negotiation 
would not violate due process. As observed in Bordenkircher, "in the 'give-and-take' 
of plea bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long as 
the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer." Id. at 363. That would 
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be the case here. "While confronting [Defendant] with the risk of more severe 
punishment clearly may have a 'discouraging effect on [Defendant's] assertion of his 
trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices [is] an inevitable'—and 
permissible—'attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the 
negotiation of pleas/" Id. at 364 (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 
(1973)). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and those stated in the State's opening brief, the 
State respectfully requests the Court to reverse the trial court's order and remand 
this case for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted April 3,2008. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
^JFPREY S.GRAY ~^/? 
{^Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellant 
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